


# Proposal for a directive on the resilience of critical entities (CER Directive)

European Commission, DG HOME

# CIR in the Security Union Strategy





#### A clear need for EU action

Limited added value
of the narrowly
focused, unevenly
implemented
European Critical
Infrastructure (ECI)
Directive

Divergent national approaches, creating an uneven playing field in the internal market

Operators inadequately equipped to address risks

An increasingly complex operational environment (evolving risk landscape, increasing interdependencies)



## Other impetuses

New EU measures, including the NIS Directive and sectoral legislation

A shift in focus (from protection to resilience), while retaining an all-hazards, risk-based approach

Calls for action by the Council, European Parliament, Commission, MS, operators and academia



## The main aim of the proposal

- To ensure the provision in the internal market of services that are essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions or economic activities; and
- To enhance the resilience of entities providing such services ('critical entities') in the Member States.



## What is new in the proposal?

From protection to resilience

From the cross-border designation of ECIs to the identification of critical entities (CEs) at national level

From 2 to 10 sectors (same as in NIS2 annex I)

Risk-based approach at MS and CE level

EU-level support and specific oversight of certain CE (of European significance)



## Sectoral coverage



- Energy\*
- Transport\*
- Banking\*\*
- Financial market infrastructures\*\*
- Health
- Drinking water
- Waste water
- Digital infrastructure\*\*
- Public administration
- Space
- \* Covered by the ECI Directive
- \*\* Certain sectoral specificities apply



#### Non-cybersecurity-related risks in focus

- All relevant *non-cybersecurity-related* natural and man-made risks that may affect the provision of essential services, including, for example:
  - Natural disasters
  - Accidents
  - Public health emergencies
  - Antagonistic threats, including terrorist offences.
- Cybersecurity-related risks addressed by the NIS2 Directive



## Main elements of the proposal

#### National framework on the

resilience of critical entities

- Strategy
- Risk assessment
- Identification of critical entities and entities equivalent to critical entities
  - Supervision, enforcement and support

#### Obligations on critical entities

- Risk assessment
- Resilience measures
- Incident notification

Specific oversight over critical entities of particular European significance

Commission support to Member States and critical entities Strategic cooperation through the Critical Entities Resilience Group



## The CER-NIS2 interplay

#### **CER Directive**

Transport
Banking
Financial market
infrastructure
Health
Drinking water
Waste water
Digital infrastructure
Public administration
Space\*\*

**Energy** 

#### NIS2

Postal and courier services
Waste management
Manufacture, production and
distribution of chemicals
Food production, processing
and distribution
Manufacturing
Digital providers\*

NIS2 is threshold-based, while CER is risk-based

NIS2 seeks to ensure cybersecurity on the part of essential and important entities, while CER ensures the overall (noncybersecurity-related) resilience of critical entities

CER covers the same ten sectors as the NIS2 'essential entities' list (CER annex = NIS2 annex I)

All critical entities per CER subject to cybersecurity obligations under NIS2



<sup>\* &#</sup>x27;Important entities' under NIS2

<sup>\*\* &#</sup>x27;Essential entities' under NIS2 and 'critical entities' upon identification under the CER Directive

#### Additional information

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/content/critical-infrastructure-resiliance\_en

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