

# Cybersecurity in the Energy Community

DIGITALISATION IN THE ENERGY SYSTEMS

**8<sup>th</sup> Workshop of Eastern Partnership Energy Regulatory  
Bodies – Energy Panel**

# Energy Community

- Extending the EU internal energy market

## Domain

*South East Europe and the Black Sea Region*


## Mission

*Creating a regulatory framework to increase:*

- *competition in the energy markets*
- *security of supply*
- *investments in infrastructure*
- *environment protection*


## Method

*Through the Rule of Law*



# Energy Community

- Legal framework





## PHLG Recommendations (March / June 2018)

- Establish a **Cooperation Group** (CPs and EU - MSs)
- Identify and eliminate **regulatory gaps**
- Put in place common **certification conditions** across the Energy Community
- Initiate cooperation on the establishment of **research and education** programmes
- Develop a common **crisis management** and **emergency response** mechanism (Treaty - Title III / Title IV)
- Step-up **public-private** cooperation in cybersecurity

## MC Procedural Act (29 November 2018)

on the establishment of Energy Community Coordination Group for Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure

### (CyberCG)

- **Domains** (of critical infrastructure / essential services in):
  - **Electricity** / Natural gas / Oil / pollution and combustion emissions
  - **Digital and electronic communications** (services provided to energy operators)
- **Stakeholders**
  - **Ministries** (energy / climate / digital communications & information technologies), **NRAs**
  - **Operators** of critical infrastructure / essential services (**Production** / **TSOs** / **DSOs**)
  - National **CSIRTs**

## MC Procedural Act (29 November 2018)

on the establishment of Energy Community Coordination Group for Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure

### (CyberCG)

- Relevant EU *acquis* provisions
  - on **Electronic communications networks and services** - Directive 2002/21/EC
  - on **Critical infrastructures** (identification / designation / protection) - Directive 2008/114/EC
  - on security of network and information systems (essential services) - **NIS Directive** - Directive (EU) 2016/1148
  - European **standardization** in information security - Regulation No. 1025/2012/EU

## MC Procedural Act (29 November 2018)


on the establishment of Energy Community Coordination Group for Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure

### (CyberCG)

- **Tasks**

- establish **administrative and operational environment** (focal points / liaison officers)
- communicate **information** (reports / strategies / measures) and **knowledge** (training / research and development / public awareness)
- Develop and apply **EU-coherent methodologies** for **risk assessment** / security criteria / **identification and designation** of essential services and critical infrastructures,
- apply **EU standards** on information security and relevant technologies,
- establish a **CSIRTs network** (security incidents and threats / **capacity building** / blueprint for cooperation and early warning / mutual assistance)
- facilitate **cooperation with EU MSs** / gaining observers' status in **ENISA**

- **Domain:** all **EnC** Contracting Parties
- **Scope:** **electricity / gas** authorities, NRA, operators (TSO / DSO), producers, public domain
- **Timeline:**
  - Inception Report: **22 February 2019**
  - First Workshop: **11 April 2019**
  - Final Deadline: **October 2019**








## Objectives

- Assess the legal / regulatory environment and identify the **regulatory gaps**
- Assess the potential **cyber threats** and risks
- Identify the **relevant provisions** of the acquis and provide **impact assessment** of their implementation in the Energy Community
- Propose the necessary **measures** on national level to improve cybersecurity
- Propose a **model** for regional cooperation in managing cybersecurity risks and reporting incidents

- **Task 1 (stocktaking)** – identification and assessment (**in particular**)
  - Existing cybersecurity **environment** (legal / policy / administrative / regulatory / enforcement / market)
  - Existing **measures in place** (pursuant to acquis / Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime)
  - Existing **cross-border cooperation** (practices / initiatives / contingencies and potential synergies)
  - the **ongoing projects** (national / regional) and **TA** related to cybersecurity
  - cybersecurity **standards** and **certification schemes** applied in Contracting Parties
  - existing **education** and **training** programmes (expert / public domain) related to cybersecurity
- **Task 2 (analysis)** – identification of
  - the **legal and regulatory gaps** inconsistencies
  - gaps in **cybersecurity standards**

- Task 3 (recommendations)
  - Propose **amendments, measures, and recommendations** necessary to implement **minimum common framework** addressing cybersecurity of critical infrastructures
  - Propose **cooperation mechanisms** in the Energy Community (criteria for the identification of large-scale cybersecurity incidents, cross-border cooperation, relevant actors and standard operating procedures, participation in ENISA)
  - Provide recommendations how **to align certification schemes** and procedures
  - Propose mechanisms for **research, education and training** programmes (**expert level and public domain**)
  - Provide **impact assessment** for implementation of the proposed acts and measures
  - Develop a **roadmap with the timing** for the implementation

## Risk assessment Methodology





## Next Steps

- On-site visits (May – June)
  - Energy / cybersecurity authorities
  - NRAs
  - TSOs
  - Major DSOs / producers / stakeholders
- Risk assessment (early June)
  - Consequences (categories)
  - Capability / motivation and likelihood
  - Risk scenarios
- First Interim report (July)

Draft Conclusions – stemming from the First Meeting and the Procedural Act for establishment of the CyberCG

- **Tasks of the ECS** – before October 2019
  - Draft Biannual **Work Program** on the format, operation procedures and targets of CyberCG
  - Draft Program for **Capacity Building** in Cybersecurity (for Ministries, NRA, other authorities)
  - Draft Annual **Report** (establishment, operation, activities, results, Study Findings and Recommendations)
  
- **Tasks on National Level** – before October 2019
  - Appointment of **Focal Points** (Ministries, NRA, Operators of CI, CSIRTs)
  - Provide support and information for the **Cybersecurity Study**
  - Include Cybersecurity in **Tendering Rules** for new CI in the energy sector
  - Propose candidates and communicate in the selection of **Chairperson** of the CyberCG

**Draft Conclusions** – stemming from the First Meeting and the Procedural Act for establishment of the CyberCG

- **Tasks of the CyberCG**
  - Establish a Working Group on **Critical Infrastructures** consisting of Ministries, **NRA**, Operators – a draft **Work Plan** shall be developed by 30 October 2019
  - Establish a Working Group on **Governance** consisting of Ministries, **NRA**, CSIRTs – including cybersecurity legislation and technical standards (to the necessary level) – a draft **Work Plan** shall be developed by 30 September 2019
  - Establish a permanent **Discussion Panel** (network) for **CSIRTs** – including CSIRT communication channels, coordination in applied methodology and standards – target to establish an **Energy CSIRT** cooperation structure in the Energy Community – draft **Work Plan** shall be developed by 30 September 2019
  - Develop a **Program** for training, education and **capacity building** for specific sectors – including (1) Policy authorities and **NRA**, and (2) CI Operators – draft proposal by 30 October 2019
  - Cooperation with **EC, ENISA, CEER, ENTSO-E / ENTSOG**

## Particularities and Identified Actions

- **Real-time Requirements** – cannot be addressed by standard cyber security solutions
  - Use international standards
  - Apply physical measures
  - Classify/manage your assets
  - Consider privately owned communication networks, or consider specific measures
  - Split system into logical zones
  - Choose secure communication and authentication
  
- **Cascading effects** – an outage in one country might trigger black-outs in other sectors and countries
  - Evaluate interdependencies
  - Ensure communication framework for early warnings and to cooperate in crisis
  - Ensure level of security for new devices
  - Consider cyber-physical spill overs
  - Establish design criteria for a resilient grid



## Particularities and Identified Actions

- **Technology mix** – risks from (1) legacy components and (2) from new Internet-of-Things devices
  - Follow a cybersecurity-oriented approach when connecting devices
  - Use international standards
  - Establish monitoring and analysis capabilities
  - Conduct specific cybersecurity risk analysis for legacy installations
  - Collaborate with technology providers
  - Update hard- and software

## Next Steps

- Application of the Recommendation
- Preparation of a “Network Code” for electricity (cybersecurity)
- Certification of energy technologies

## ENTSO-E Platform on Cyber Risk Mitigation

### Challenges

- **Regulation** – the regulatory framework does not yet facilitate effective trans-national cooperation
  - **Country-level** regulations may forbid sharing of information
  - Problems between **EU** and **NON-EU** members
- **Organization** – diversity of sizes and technologies
  - **Complexity** of the ENTSO-E power system
  - Connection of extremely **diverse facilities** (generators, loads) in size and technology
  - Large **stakeholder setup** – entanglement between large operators (TSO / RSC, DSO)

### Policies

- **Security** – prevention control and compliance with standards
- **Resilience** – incident monitoring, detection, response and recovery capability

