



European Union Agency for the Cooperation
of Energy Regulators

Resource adequacy framework and Capacity Mechanisms

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ACER's role regarding resource adequacy

- Approving/amending methodologies underlying the decision-making process (Regulation 2019/941, Art.23(6), Art.26(11))
- Approving the European resource adequacy assessments (Regulation 2019/941, Art.23(7))
- Monitoring the performance of Member States in the area of security of supply (Regulation 2019/942, Art. 15(1))
- Monitoring security of supply measures (Regulation 2019/941, Art. 18(3))
- **ACER brings value by**
 - **Highlighting the benefits of mutual interdependency and well-functioning markets**
 - **Increasing transparency and understanding of this topic, and**
 - **Putting pressure to deliver these benefits**
- ACER mainly has soft power (with a hard edge). Member States and the European Commission are the main decision-makers.

↓ Latest from ACER



13.10.2022


[ACER publishes the 2021 monitoring report on security of electricity supply.](#)

- **Introduction**
- **Monitoring resource adequacy**
- **Introducing capacity markets**

Introduction


Security of supply: Keeping the lights on

- Risk Preparedness Regulation 2019/941 Art.2(1):
“security of supply means the ability of an electricity system to guarantee the supply of electricity to customers with a clearly established level of performance, as determined by the Member States concerned”
- System Operation Regulation 2017/1485 Art.3(68):
“adequacy means the ability of in-feeds into an area to meet the load in that area”




Source: ENTSO-E

From short- to long-term adequacy



The Electricity Regulation provides a clear framework to:

1. **Define** the desired/necessary level of resource adequacy at Member State level
2. **Assess** the expected adequacy over the long-term horizon (through an EU wide assessment & optional national assessments)
3. Setting principles for selecting and designing the measures to **improve** adequacy and cope with potential adequacy concerns



Treating the problem, not the symptom

- **What is the root cause?**
 - Imperfect markets
 - Uncertainty: changing energy landscape
- **Address root causes first – develop a market reform plan**
 - Improve wholesale market design
 - Enable participation of all resources
 - Increase interconnection capacity
- As a **last resort**, Contracting Parties can introduce capacity mechanisms



Monitoring resource adequacy

Electricity Regulation 2019/943 , Articles 20, 23 - 27

- Key goal: **markets first**, intervention only on the basis of a **coordinated and harmonised approach**.
- Monitoring of resource adequacy primarily based on the single **European Resource Adequacy Assessment (ERAA)**.
- ...against **national targets** that are calculated based on a single European methodology.
- **Security of supply shall be delivered primarily by the market**
Electricity Regulation, recital 26: *..., short-term markets and scarcity pricing contribute to the removal of other market distortive measures, such as capacity mechanisms, in order to ensure security of supply.*
- **Member States decide on the level of security of supply**
Electricity Regulation, recital 46: *Member States should have the **freedom to set their own desired level of security of supply**.*
- **Clear adequacy targets shall be in place for capacity mechanisms**
Electricity Regulation, recital 46: *Member States intending to introduce **capacity mechanisms** should derive **resource adequacy targets** on the basis of a transparent and verifiable process.*

Electricity Regulation Art.25


- When applying capacity mechanisms CPs shall have a **reliability standard** in place:
 - set by the CP or by a competent authority,
 - following a proposal by the regulatory authority,
 - based on a specific methodology ([ACER Decision 23/2020](#)),
 - using at least the value of lost load (VOLL) and the cost of new entry (CONE) over a given timeframe and
 - expressed as ‘expected energy not served’ and ‘loss of load expectation’.



If a CM is already in place, VOLL shall be calculated until **25 July 2025** (transposed Electricity Regulation, Art.(11))

Calculating the reliability standard


- The [methodology](#) seeks to calculate a socioeconomically efficient reliability standard
- It strikes a balance between the cost of having additional capacity (CONE) and the benefits of having less demand disconnections (measured by the VOLL).
- VOLL estimates are based on appropriate surveys seeking to reveal how consumers value uninterrupted electricity supply.
- CONE estimates are based on techno-economic information of all possible resources that can be deployed in order to reduce demand disconnections (incl. DSR/storage).



Source: ACER, [SOS monitoring report](#).

The reliability standard is expressed as loss of load expectation (LOLE, hours per year).

Examples of reliability standards in the EU



Source: ACER, [SOS monitoring report - 2021](#), based on NRA data.


Notes: Implementation of the VOLL/CONE/RS methodology based on NRA declarations; the actual degree of compliance is not examined.

Electricity regulation, Art. 24


- CPs shall monitor resource adequacy on the basis of the **European resource adequacy assessment (ERAA)**
- They may complement ERAA with **national resource adequacy assessments (NRAA)**.
- The NRAAs:
 - shall be **regional**
 - shall be based on the **same methodology (ERAA methodology, [ACERs Decision 24/2020](#))**
 - shall contain the **same central reference scenarios** as in ERAA
 - may include additional sensitivities considering national particularities using consistent data and tools complementary to the ERAA.

ERAA principles

- Covers EU + Western Balkans + Ukraine + Turkey + Tunisia
- Has a ten year horizon
- Is based on a probabilistic assessment
- Includes central reference scenarios
- May include separate scenarios and sensitivities
- Includes an economic viability assessment of resources (EVA)
- Simulates market characteristics







- A resource adequacy concern is identified by comparing:
 - the forecast level of adequacy
 - the reliability standard
- The ERAA methodology (Art. 8) defines the adequacy concern **on the basis of the results of the central reference scenario**




Electricity Regulation Art.24(3)

- Adequacy concerns are identified either in ERAA or in NRAAs
- If NRAA shows concern where ERAA sees none then the NRAA shall justify this divergence
 - assumptions
 - sensitivities
- The NRAA report shall be published and submitted to the Energy Community Secretariat
- Within 4 months the Secretariat will issue an opinion on whether the differences are justified, taking into account ECRB's opinion and ACERs consultation
- If necessary the NRAA shall be amended according to the opinion; if not full reasoning for not doing so shall be provided.

Adequacy concern in any of the next 10 years

-  Adequacy concern
-  No adequacy concern
-  No assessment in 2021
-  No data provided



- The maps shows adequacy concern in Member States in any of the next 10 years indicated by the NRAA performed in 2021.
- Thirteen Member States performed a NRAA in 2021. Seven of these assessments identify adequacy concerns in at least one of the coming ten years.

Treating the problem, not the symptom

- **What is the root cause?**
 - Imperfect markets
 - Uncertainty: changing energy landscape
- **Address root causes first – develop a market reform plan**
 - Improve wholesale market design
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- As a **last resort**, Contracting Parties can introduce capacity mechanisms



Electricity Regulation Art.20(2)-(3)

- Prior to any out of market measures like capacity mechanism, CPs that identified a resource adequacy concerns shall
 - identify **regulatory distortions** or **market failures**;
 - produce an **implementation plan** (marker reform plans) to address these distortions/failures;
 - include **measures** and a **timeline**.
- CPs shall in particular consider the following:
 - removing **regulatory distortions**;
 - removing **price caps**;
 - introducing a **shortage pricing** for balancing energy;
 - increase **interconnection** and strengthen **internal grid**;
 - enable **self-generation**, **energy storage**, **demand side** measures and **energy efficiency**;
 - ensure cost-efficient and market-based procurement of balancing and ancillary services;
 - remove **regulated prices**.

Process

- CPs identify adequacy concern
- CPs submit implementation plan to EnCS
- EnCS issues opinion after 4 months on sufficiency of the measures
- CPS amend the plan if needed
- CPs monitor application of plans and publish annual report
- EnCS issues an annual opinion on implementation of the plans
- CPs to stick to the plan even if adequacy concerns have been removed

Capacity mechanisms

Electricity Regulation 2019/943, Articles 21-22

What is a capacity mechanism?

Electricity Regulation. Art. 2(22): ‘*capacity mechanism*’ means

- a **temporary** measure...
- ...to ensure the achievement of the **necessary** level of resource adequacy...
- ...by remunerating resources for their **availability**,...
- ...**excluding** measures relating to ancillary services or congestion management;

Advantages:

- Help to secure supplies
- Provide certainty for investors




Drawbacks:

- Costs can be high
- Consistent with the energy transition?
- Distort market functioning?


Capacity mechanisms in the EU

Capacity mechanism type

- Market wide – central buyer
- Market wide – de-centralised obligation
- Strategic reserves
- Targeted capacity payment
- No CM



Total cost of capacity mechanisms in the EU



Note: 2022-2023 are forecasts

Source: ACER, [SOS monitoring report](#), based on NRA data.

*; ** Portugal and Spain have legacy contracts but no effective mechanism in place

When to introduce capacity mechanisms?

Electricity Regulation Art. 21

- **After** adequacy concerns are identified in the ERAA and/or NRAA...
- , **and** implementation plans developed and received opinion by the EnCS...
- ...as a **last resort** to tackle **residual** resource adequacy concerns and taking into account State Aid rules...
- ... after examining the effect of the mechanism on **neighbouring** markets and **consulting** relevant CPs/MSs

NOTE:


- For **applied** capacity mechanisms no new contracts shall be signed if ERAA and NRAA do not identify adequacy concerns or the implementation plans has not received opinion by the EnCS
- A smooth phase out shall be included in the design of capacity mechanisms
- State Aid approval process shall be applied

What type of capacity mechanism?

Electricity Regulation, Art.21 (3)

- CPs shall examine whether a **strategic reserve** can address the remaining adequacy concerns
- If not they may introduce other types of capacity mechanisms

Taxonomy of capacity mechanisms*



* Visual adjusted from the [final report of the sector inquiry on capacity mechanisms](#) SWD(2016) 385 final

Electricity Regulation, Art. 22 (1)

All capacity mechanisms shall:

- be **temporary**;
- **not create** undue **market distortions** and **not limit cross-zonal trade**;
- not go beyond what is **necessary** to address the identified adequacy concerns;
- select capacity in a **transparent, non-discriminatory** and **competitive** way;
- incentivise capacity providers to **be available during expected system stress**;
- ensure **remuneration** is determined in a **competitive** way;
- set eligibility criteria for participation **in advance** of the selection;
- be technology neutral;
- apply appropriate penalties for non delivery.

NOTE !

Article 22(5): **Existing capacity mechanism** shall be adapted to comply with **Chapter 4** without prejudice to commitments or contracts concluded by 31 December 2022.

Article 25(4)

The amount of capacity procured shall be approved by the CP, on the basis of a **proposal of the regulatory authority**.

Electricity Regulation, Art. 22 (2), (3)

For **strategic reserves**

- activation only if TSOs foresee full use of the balancing resources;
- when activated imbalances are to be settled at least at VOLL or higher than the intraday technical price limit, whichever is higher;
- the output of the strategic reserve is to be attributed to BRPs through the imbalance settlement mechanism;
- strategic reserves are **not** remunerated from the wholesale/balancing market;
- strategic reserves are held outside the market for the contractual period (or beyond)

Capacity mechanisms **other than** strategic reserves

- shall ensure that the price for capacity automatically tends to zero when supply for capacity meets the needs;
- remunerate only for availability (not energy) and do not affect decisions on whether or not to generate;
- ensure transferability of obligations (secondary market)

- **No contracts or payments if:**
 - capacity starts commercial production on or after 15 Dec 2022, and emits more than **550 g of CO₂ of fossil fuel origin per kWh of electricity**;
 - from **1 July 2025** at the latest, for capacity started commercial production before 15 Dec 2022, and emits more than 550 g of CO₂ of fossil fuel origin per kWh of electricity **and** more than **350 kg CO₂ of fossil fuel origin on average per year per installed kW_e**.
- Emission limits shall be calculated on the basis of the **design efficiency** of the generation unit (net efficiency at nominal capacity).
- CPs need to **take into account** ACER's opinion on the calculation of the emission limits ([ACER Opinion 22/2019](#) and [calculation examples](#))
- In essence:
 - only efficient gas plants or co-firing power plants (550 g/kWh_e limit)
 - coal/lignite only for strategic reserves (350 kg CO₂/kW_e limit)

Electricity Regulation Art.26



- Capacity mechanisms shall allow participation of foreign capacity providers from other CPs or MSs
- Exclusion only for strategic reserves if this is not technically feasible
- Foreign capacity shall compete with domestic capacity in the same process
- For existing schemes **interconnectors** may participate up 4 years after adoption
- CPs can decide whether to allow foreign participation only from neighbouring CPs/MSs or from others
- Participation in **more than one** mechanism is allowed; if not available to fulfil multiple commitments they shall be exposed to non-availability payments
- Maximum allowable cross border participation (maximum entry capacity, MEC) calculated based on specific methodology by RCCs and **recommended** to TSOs
- Technical details on implementation are clarified in Technical Specifications ([ACERs Decision 36/2020](#)) (MEC calculation, revenue sharing, TSO-TSO cooperation, registry of capacity providers)



Concluding

- **ERAA is the main resource adequacy assessment tool**
 - Ensure that ENTSO-E gets the necessary information to carry it out
- **Proper NRAAs can complement ERAA**
 - ERAA [methodology](#) is demanding
- **In case of adequacy concerns, fix the problems first**
 - Identify why the market is not delivering adequacy
 - Fix the problems (implementation plans)
- **If concerns persist and a capacity mechanism is considered (or already exists)**
 - Calculate VOLL, CONE, and reliability standard according to the [methodology](#)
 - Check if a strategic reserve will do the job
 - Respect the design principles of the CMs
 - Allow for cross border participation
- **Monitor the situation regularly and make corrections where necessary**



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