

The background is a satellite-style image of Europe at night, with city lights visible. Overlaid on this are numerous glowing blue lines that represent energy transmission routes, connecting various points across the continent and extending into the surrounding regions.

ECDSO-E and Security of Supply

ECDSO-E meeting, Vienna, 17 April 2018

❖ Security of Supply

- Treaty – Title III – Article 29: **SoS Statements**
- Treaty – Title IV – Article 46: **Procedural act on mutual assistance**

❖ PA 2008/02/MC-ENC

- Establishment of SoS Coordination Group (11 December 2008),
- Electricity SG (2001)
 - EC, Parties (representatives) – EnC-CPs, Title III Countries (voluntary)
 - TSO, local industry – upon invitation (becoming common practice)
 - Industry associations (ENTSO-E, EFET, EURELECTRIC) – upon invitation
 - Meetings – once a year (December), ad hoc / urgency meetings (possibility)
 - Agenda – winter preparedness (review), legal developments (TYNDP, generation adequacy, NC / GL, clean energy package, RES, licensing), security coordination centres, data transparency (ETUG), specific topics and events (market restriction cases, countries in focus)

❖ TSO-2-DSO

- Coordination between network layers
 - Structural aspects (definition, integration, compatibility, TPA, network capacity, development planning, network security)
 - Operational aspects (dispatching, balancing, demand management)
 - data transparency, monitoring, data transfer (channels), smart grid functions
- RES integration
 - RES connection (DSO), dispatching (central), balance responsibility – aggregators, concentrators, prosumers, mandatory buyout, access to market
 - Network services, cross-border trade aspects (congestions, redispatching), end-user supply aspects (curtailment), demand management
 - RES deployment - support mechanisms, VAT, public procurements, licensing


❖ Cybersecurity

- Cyber attacks on electricity networks (successful)
 - **Ukraine, December 2015** – three Oblenergo (DSO) systems compromised: **Prykarpattya** – switched off 30 SS (230.000 citizens) for a period of 6 hours; **Chernivtsi** and **Kiyv** to lower extent - imposed vast damage on systems and data
 - **Ukraine, December 2016** – 330 kV Transmission SS **Kiyv North** SCADA system compromised causing blackout for 1/5 of Kiyv demand for one hour – advanced, automated malware, swappable, adaptable and universal, simultaneous threat to multiple systems
- NIS Directive - (EU) 2016/1148
 - ECS prepared draft adaptation and a Recommendation for application - for the latest PHLG
 - PHLG Conclusion acknowledged the necessity to increase cybersecurity, risk management and reporting capacity – to take steps / discussions for adaptation and prepare a proposal with the appropriate timing
 - PHLG – eliminate regulatory gaps, develop cooperation in cybersecurity

NIS Directive (essentials)



- Build sufficient capabilities at national level
- Identification of operators of essential services and digital service providers to whom security and incident notifications requirements are imposed
- Build structures for cross-border cooperation and exchange of information
- Three cumulative conditions for identification of Operators of Essential Services (OES)
- Security and Notification Requirements imposed on OES
- Monitoring and enforcement powers



- Create a Cooperation Group between CPs and MSs
- Security of Supply Coordination Group
- Put in place a common certification framework across the single market
- Eliminate regulatory gaps across the single market
- Join efforts on research and education programmes
- Develop a common crisis management and rapid emergence response, *inter alia* through Title III or Title IV measures
- Further challenges specific to the energy sector



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