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# Policy Guidelines on Competitive Selection and Support for Renewable Energy

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# 1. Introduction and Overview

## 1.1 Context

Reducing greenhouse gas emissions from the energy sector is critical to mitigate climate change. IEA projections show that to limit global warming to less than 2°C, global emissions from the energy sector must fall by more than 70% from 31 GtCO<sub>2e</sub> in 2015 to less than 9 GtCO<sub>2e</sub> in 2050. The electricity sector is in turn central to achieving that goal, through a combination of (i) decarbonising electricity production and (ii) shifting the energy sources for activities such as heating and transport to electricity. The decarbonisation of electricity production depends heavily on massive deployment of renewable energy (RE). IEA projections show that in a scenario where global warming is kept to less than 2°C, RE will account for more than 70% of electricity production. Moreover, RE will contribute 35% of the required reductions in energy-related GHG emissions, relative to a business as usual baseline.

Support to RE in the electricity sector has historically been provided through a number of means – ranging from quota schemes based on tradable green certificates to administratively determined feed-in tariffs. The choice of the support scheme is frequently dependent on the maturity of the electricity market. Despite sustained reductions in the cost of several forms of RE, in many cases costs remain higher than for conventional sources. In addition, the characteristics of electricity production from many RE sources differ markedly from the characteristics of conventional sources such as coal and gas. In particular most renewables tend to have a near-zero marginal cost of generation, which is much lower than their average generation cost. This characteristic poses challenges for the design of electricity markets and for attracting investments in RE in energy-only markets. Accordingly it remains necessary in most cases for the regulatory framework of electricity sectors to provide some form of support to RE. This form of support primarily takes the form of additional revenues for the electricity generated by RE, typically delivered under a long-term contractual arrangement.

A broad consensus amongst policy makers has emerged that competitions are the optimal means to determine the level of support to utility scale<sup>1</sup> RE projects and to select the projects to which support is provided. For the purposes of these Guidelines the term "competition" refers to approaches that share the common feature of relying on a competitive process rather than an administrative determination. These approaches include tenders and auctions.

Competitions reveal costs, ensure cost-efficient development and can effectively drive costs down. Competitions also provide a transparent and objective means for identifying the recipients of this financial support. Granting support for RE on market-based principles, namely through the introduction of competitions, is also mandated for many types of projects by the EU's 2014 Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection and Energy (EEAG 2014-2020, the **State Aid Guidelines** – see below for further details). They have been widely used across a range of countries – both EU and non-EU – and appear to be partly responsible for the sharp reductions in the cost of supporting RE seen in recent years.

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<sup>1</sup> The benefits of competitions may not be realised for small scale or distributed projects given the comparatively high transaction costs and multiple potential projects and agents. This is anticipated in the EU State Aid Guidelines discussed further below, which set thresholds below which competitions do not need to be employed. The focus of these Guidelines is on larger projects, which fall above those thresholds.

The primary goal of RE competitions is to meet renewable energy objectives in the most cost-effective way. This is achieved by facilitating competition among credible RE developers. Consumers benefit through lower costs, while policy makers achieve greater control over the RE sector's development. In addition, use of RE competitions is consistent with EU energy sector and State Aid guidelines (which apply in the EU, the EEA and the Energy Community). Competitions can also help address policy makers' concerns to be able to demonstrate that regulation is ensuring the "right" level of support for RE and avoiding overcompensation of investors. The ability of competitions to address such concerns, which have sometimes led to renegotiations or retroactive changes, can reduce the regulatory risks faced by investors. Investors also benefit from the transparency provided by well-designed competition processes, allowing them to compete on a level playing field.

## 1.2 The EU State Aid Guidelines

The State Aid Guidelines set out the principles that will guide the enforcement of EU State aid rules. They also set the conditions under which State aid for environmental protection and energy objectives may be considered compatible with the EU Treaty and, by extension and in the case of the Energy Community members, the Energy Community Treaty. They require that, in principle, aid is granted through competitive procedures based on clear, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria and in the form of a premium in addition to the market price. For further details and derogations see Annex 1.

## 1.3 Purpose and scope

The purpose of these Guidelines is to set out the common position of the Energy Community Secretariat (the **EnCS**) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the **EBRD**) on the key design principles that should be adopted to competitively set the level, and select the recipients, of public support for renewable electricity. The parameters underpinning these design principles are that:

- The arrangements should deliver support for RE at the lowest cost, and greatest efficiency, consistent with the other parameters set out below.
- The arrangements should be consistent with European energy law and guidance, including the State Aid Guidelines. They should minimise market distortions and facilitate market liberalisation.
- The arrangements should be transparent, open, predictable and objective. They should have, and maintain, broad investor confidence.
- The arrangements should deliver the desired level of renewable energy deployment in the desired timeframe.

## 1.4 Application

These Guidelines are intended specifically for the countries which are both parties to the Energy Community Treaty<sup>2</sup> and EBRD countries of operation. These countries are, in general, at a relatively early stage of electricity market liberalisation and, with some exceptions, have limited penetration of renewable energy (see Annex 3 for the current status of renewable energy in each of the countries). Accordingly any RE support mechanism must be relatively simple in order to build confidence, experience and familiarity amongst all stakeholders (such as government authorities, regulators, network operators, developers and investors).

Over time, as countries progressively liberalise their electricity markets and grow their renewable energy sectors, they may adopt more complex RE support schemes that are tailored to their specific contexts. The Guidelines anticipate this development to an extent.

Despite the specific focus on countries that are both EBRD countries of operation and parties to the Energy Community Treaty, these Guidelines draw upon a wide spectrum of international experience and the principles outlined will be relevant to many other countries.

## 1.5 Structure of Guidelines

These Guidelines are divided into four broad areas – namely:

- (1) the overall framework for the competitive process;
- (2) choices relating to what is being procured;
- (3) choices relating to the selection process; and
- (4) the mechanism for the delivery of RE support.

## 2. Guidelines on the Overall Framework

### 2.1 Develop an overall strategy for RE development

→ Policy makers should develop and publish a strategy for the development of renewable energy, including: *long-term plans* that identify targets for renewable energy generation (for example, looking 10 years ahead); and *short-term plans* identifying the competitions that will deliver the target for the coming two to three years. Plans should be developed with a view to promoting a viable long-term RE market that is of a sufficient scale to interest market participants and can be easily integrated in the competitive electricity market. Long-term targets should be consistent with any international obligations and be part of an integrated energy and climate policy planning framework. Moreover, the strategy for implementing plans should be consistent with the legal framework – notably state aid and competition laws.

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<sup>2</sup> As at 1 November 2017, those countries are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, Ukraine.

## 2.2 Have clear plans for future RE competitions

→ Short-term plans should provide stakeholders with a transparent and predictable schedule of upcoming RE competitions. Upcoming RE competitions may include both stand-alone competitions (for example, one-off tenders for specific sites) and broader competition schemes (for example, successive rounds of auctions). Such plans should be consistent with overall targets for RE, as well as other plans for the energy sector such as market opening and the development of grid infrastructure. Any new or revised support scheme (although not individual instances of aid awarded under a scheme) should be notified to the domestic State aid authority, which should consult the EnCS on compliance. Any State aid authorisation for a scheme is valid for a maximum of 10 years after which it must be re-notified. The length for which support is provided to individual projects through a scheme is not subject to the 10 years limit.

## 2.3 Structure initial competition schemes to learn lessons

→ Policy makers should structure competition schemes to allow lessons to be learnt at initial stages – notably by holding a “pilot” competition at the start of a broader competition scheme. The pilot should feature in the short-term plan for RE development. A pilot competition should have characteristics similar to the planned competition scheme, and its features should be designed to provide meaningful lessons to policy makers and market participants. For example, project size restrictions should be such that the types of market participants the pilot attracts are similar to those targeted by the competition scheme itself.

## 2.4 Nominate a credible institution to administer the competitive process

→ Credibility is the key selection criteria for the institution administering the competition. Features such as the technical capacity, human resource capacity, legal standing and reputation will all contribute to the credibility of the administrator, and should therefore be used as criteria for its selection. The choice of the institution may vary across countries, and may include regional institutions. The institution should have an active role in shaping the design of the competitions (if it does not already have primary responsibility for designing them).

## 2.5 Manage the competitive process transparently

→ The timeline for each competition should be published prior to its start and should be binding on the body administering the competition. The timeline should include all of the main steps of the process (announcement of competition; consultation; opening of bid round; bid submission; closing of bid round; selection/evaluation; contract signature and plant commissioning) and provide sufficient time to complete each step. A comprehensive communication strategy should be developed – including, for example, setting-up a specific website and conducting bidder information sessions. The policy maker should publish a comprehensive set of supporting documents, including templates of all key agreements (e.g. offtake, grid connection, land use) and information on the institution administering the competition.

## 2.6 Establish a process for dispute resolution

→ The establishment of effective dispute resolution mechanisms is necessary at all stages of competitions (i.e. from the initial stages of procurement to project commissioning). Key aspects of the competition (for example, bid bonds) should be covered by contractual arrangements with clear dispute resolution mechanisms that are acceptable to stakeholders. In markets with limited experience of RE support mechanisms the use of an international dispute resolution process will increase investor confidence and hence lower the cost of capital. The Energy Community established a Dispute Resolution and Negotiation Center facilitating alternative dispute resolution.

## 3. Guidelines on Choices Relating to what is Being Procured

### 3.1 Set a limit on the total size of the competition

→ For each competition, policy makers should set fixed quantity limits in terms of the amount of RE generation *capacity* to be supported. This allows policy makers to retain close control of the development of RE, including its budgetary implications and impact on the electricity system and markets. In case RE support costs are significantly different from what was expected (for example, because of lower than expected bids), the policy maker may amend short-term plans. The policy maker should set out in advance a transparent process for how it will make such amendments. Once the RE sector is more developed, policy makers can consider other approaches to determine the quantity limit (such as a budget-based cap).

### 3.2 Consider using a price ceiling

→ A price ceiling is a useful design element to limit the budgetary risk faced by the competition administrator and should be used in particular in initial competitions that are based on capacity-based quantity limits. The competition administrator can use the previously determined feed-in-tariff (potentially adjusted for recent developments) as a benchmark for the price ceiling. Furthermore, the price ceiling should only be disclosed after the competition and only in specific scenarios (e.g. when the maximum price is a binding constraint in the competition).

### 3.3 Set size limits for individual projects

→ Maximum size restrictions on individual projects participating in a competition should be set to find a balance between:

- (a) achieving economies of scale so that consumers benefit from lower cost;
- (b) attracting a wider pool of international developers (which are likely to find larger projects more attractive); and
- (c) securing participation of multiple project developers to broaden the pool of market participants. This can be achieved by placing restrictions on maximum size (and the number of investors participating in more than one project) so that multiple projects can be awarded to different investors for the overall level of capacity to be procured in a competition.



Minimum restrictions may be imposed to ensure that the administrative burden of assessing bids is proportionate to the level of capacity procured. Minimum size restrictions could correspond to the minimum thresholds in the State Aid Guidelines beyond which support must be granted through a competitive process.

### 3.4 Start with technology specific competitions

→ When moving to competitions to support RE, technology-specific competitions should be used as an initial step – in particular, when required by: the need to achieve diversification; network constraints; and grid stability. Once RE competitions become well established, technology neutral competitions should be considered.

### 3.5 Consider location specific competitions

→ For the first competitions in a market, or in situations where the specific circumstances warrant it,<sup>3</sup> specifying the location(s) and making land available is likely to reduce the upfront costs for bidders and thus generate lower support costs. If the authorities choose to make land plots available for RE development in line with the applicable state aid rules, this will reduce costs and barriers to entry for developers. If the RE segment is well-established so that a number of developers are well-placed to develop projects, the choice of location should be left to the market, with policy makers focussing on providing detailed and specific criteria to ensure that projects proposed in a competition are comparable (see below).

### 3.6 Completely define the project scope

Bidders should be provided with a complete and specific description of what the projects they are bidding for must deliver. This should include clarity on technological requirements. Moreover, the procedures and requirements (as well as their associated costs) for integration of RE into electricity systems and markets should be clearly identified. In particular:

*Grid connection:* requirements for grid connection and the provision of supporting infrastructure should be clearly specified so that bidders can identify their associated costs.

*Balancing:* following the State Aid Guidelines, balancing responsibility may be postponed to the point in time when a liquid intraday electricity market is accessible to RE producers. Moreover, other elements such as well-specified balancing market arrangements and the ability to use balancing aggregators are also desirable to enable the introduction of balancing responsibility.

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<sup>3</sup> For example, if there is a particular site in the country that is well-suited to RE development and has few competing uses.

*Dispatch:* the support arrangements should ensure priority of dispatch for renewable producers insofar as the secure operation of the national electricity system permits. Where the support is delivered through the mechanism of a contract-for-differences, the RE producers should ensure that electricity produced is offered in the day-ahead market at a price that ensures the electricity is actually sold and thus dispatched. The network operators should compensate the renewable producers when their production is curtailed. The curtailment of electricity produced from renewable energy sources should be based on transparent and non-discriminatory criteria amongst renewable energy producers. The network operators should take in advance grid and market-related operational measures to minimize the curtailments of electricity produced from renewable energy sources.

## 4. Guidelines on Choices Relating to the Selection Process

### 4.1 Rely on appropriately sized bid bonds to ensure sufficient well qualified bidders

→ Successful competitions require a number of bidders that exceeds the available capacity. Accordingly it is important to have prequalification requirements that are not excessively onerous. Successful competitions should also deter the participation of unqualified bidders who may bid unrealistically and be unable to deliver the required capacity. The use of bid bonds and completion bonds (see below) set at appropriate levels can meet these twin goals. Other criteria for financial capacity are less important if bonds are used, thus reducing the administrative burden associated with the competition administration.

→ In the initial stages of moving to competitions, when the existing pool of RE developers or investors is small, bid-bond requirements should be kept low. It is recommended that they are set towards the lower end of the range observed internationally, which is 1.5-3.5% of expected project costs. Such levels should encourage competition and provide a disincentive only to the most speculative of bidders. The level of the bid-bond should account for the stringency of the technical, financial and integrity qualification criteria used. A higher bid-bond would require less stringent criteria, and a lower one stricter criteria.

### 4.2 Ensure that bidders have the technical capacity to deliver the project

→ Prequalification criteria related the technical capacity of the developer to deliver the project should not require extensive or country-specific past experience. Moreover, the primary focus of the assessment of technical capacity should be on the technical characteristics of the proposed project (e.g. compliance of the proposed technology with the competition requirements, environmental permits, grid connection plans). A streamlined and transparent process should be developed for bidders to obtain energy licences, land and environmental permits as well as grid connection plans if bidders are required to obtain these prior to the competition.

### 4.3 Ensure that bidders are in good standing

- A basic proof of identity and legal status (i.e. ownership structure, shareholders, directors, disclosure of current or potential legal issues and court/arbitration cases) should be provided. Clear criteria for exclusion of bidders on legal grounds should be set out in the competition rules.

### 4.4 Award projects on the basis of the price bid

- For simplicity and effectiveness, the selection of winning bids from those that meet all prequalification criteria should be based solely on the criterion of price (without any adjustments for other factors).

### 4.5 Use a simple procedure for selecting projects

- For the first RE competitions in a sector, a single, sealed bid process is recommended. This brings clarity and simplicity to the process and lowers administrative efforts. More sophisticated approaches could be considered as expertise grows and the market develops, but add little benefit in the initial stages of implementing competitions. Policy makers should develop well-specified rules that cover different outcomes such as tied bids or bids exceeding the quantity limit. Furthermore, the development of the competition rules should consider the interaction between different rounds of competitions. For example, losing bidders in one round could be able to pre-qualify for subsequent competitions so as to reduce costs.

### 4.6 Use pay as bid to determine the level of support

- Using pay-as-bid is recommended to determine the level of support, as the benefits of simplicity will most likely outweigh the costs of strategic bidding. Other approaches such as marginal clearing prices could be considered in the future as the number of projects subject to competitions increases and the market for renewable energy in the country matures.

### 4.7 Ensure successful bidders deliver the project

- Monitoring milestones between the award of the support to the project and its commissioning should be specified by the policy maker, along with a schedule of penalties. A completion bond, set at a level above the bid bond, should be required. The level of the bond should strike a balance between ensuring adequate incentives to complete construction and avoiding excessive cost.

## 5. Delivery of RE Support

### 5.1 Establish a support counterparty

- A support counterparty should be established for delivering support to RE projects. Moreover, it is vital that: (1) the support counterparty has a creditworthiness that allows projects to raise financing and reduce the cost of capital; and (2) that the creditworthiness of the counterparty is maintained for the full duration of the support period.

## 5.2 Define the support mechanism

- The competitive process determines the level of support provided in the form of a fixed price per unit (for example, kWh) of electricity delivered – the strike price. Support should be provided to projects through a contract-for-difference with the successful bidder (instead of a power purchase agreement). The support granted under this contract is the difference between the price with which the successful bidder was awarded (the strike price) and the market price for electricity (the reference price). This arrangement should be symmetrical so that the RE producer pays to the support provider the difference if the reference price exceeds the strike price.
- This presupposes the existence of a reference electricity price at which a producer can be realistically expected to sell electricity exists (for example, a liquid day-ahead electricity market accessible to the RE producer exists). When such a reference price does not exist (in particular, when no liquid day-ahead electricity market covering the area exists), policy makers should provide support in the form of a guaranteed purchase at a feed-in tariff (where the level of the tariff is determined by a competition). In such cases, the terms of the support for a given project can envisage switching from the feed-in-tariff to a sliding-scale feed-in premium once an easily accessible reference price materialises.

## 5.3 Document the support arrangements in a contract

- The support arrangements should be documented in a model contract between the support counterparty and the RE generator (this could, for example, be the contract for difference (see above), under which the RE producer shall be obliged to sell its electricity on the market). The contract should provide for adequate dispute resolution procedures (including alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as the one offered by the Energy Community Dispute Resolution and Negotiation Center) and include provisions for unforeseen circumstances (i.e. force majeure terms) as well as those that are beyond the control of the RE producer.

## Annex 1: Requirements Imposed by the Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection and Energy 2014-2020

The European Commission's Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 2014-2020 ("EEAG 2014-2020") set out the principles that will guide the enforcement of EU State aid rules and set the conditions under which State aid for environmental protection and energy objectives may be considered compatible with the functioning of the EU Treaty. They codify the approach that will be taken by the European Commission in assessing State aid cases in these areas.

In particular, the EEAG 2014-2020 provide with regard to aid to renewables that as of 2017 any such aid should be granted through competitive procedures based on clear, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria unless it is demonstrated that only a very limited number of projects or sites could be eligible, a competitive bidding process would lead to higher support levels or low project realisation rates (underbidding). Furthermore, such competitive bidding processes shall be open to all generators producing electricity from renewable energy sources on a non-discriminatory basis. However, if needed to achieve the long-term potential of a given new and innovative technology, diversification, address network constraints, stability of the grid or system integration costs or avoid distortions on the raw material markets from biomass support, tenders supporting specific technologies might be suitable to correct the suboptimal results reached through technology neutrality. Small-scale projects (installed capacity below 1 MW or demonstration projects, except wind projects below 6 MW or 6 generation units) are excluded from this obligation.

Furthermore, the EEAG 2014-2020 stipulate that all new aid schemes and measures must be granted in the form of a premium in addition to the market price (premium) whereby the generators sell their electricity directly in the market. Moreover, they shall be subject to standard balancing responsibilities, unless no liquid intra-day markets exist.

Moreover, the EEAG 2014-2015 address the cooperation mechanisms included in the Renewable Energy Directive related to the cross-border support for achieving the national targets. It requires that, in principle, operating aid schemes to be opened to other EEA countries and Contracting Parties of the Energy Community to limit the overall distortive effect and therefore, to minimise the cost at which the national renewable energy targets are met. These types of cross-border aid schemes between Member States to EEA or Energy Community countries on the basis of cooperation mechanisms will be considered positively and compatible with the principles of the internal market.

In the Energy Community, a strict homogeneity principle as regards the application of EU and Energy Community rules is established. This principle obliges both national enforcement authorities and the Energy Community Secretariat to ensure equal conditions of competition and a uniform application of State aid provisions throughout the Energy Community, based on precedence established by EU enforcement institutions. Therefore, the Energy Community Secretariat has issued Policy Guidelines on 24 November 2015 (PG 04/2015) which clarify that the Energy Community Secretariat as well as national enforcement authorities will follow the considerations and requirements set out in the EEAG 2014-2020 when assessing the compatibility of environmental and energy aid with the functioning of the Energy Community Treaty.

## Annex 2: Compliance with State Aid and Competition Law

### State aid law in the Energy Community

According to Energy Community law which is directly applicable in all Contracting Parties, any public aid which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or certain energy resources is incompatible with the Energy Community Treaty insofar as it affects trade of Network Energy between the Contracting Parties (Article 18(1)(c) of the Energy Community Treaty). Any such practice is to be assessed on the basis of Article 87 of the EC Treaty (as attached in Annex III to the Energy Community Treaty) which provides for a limited list of circumstances under which State aid may be compatible with the common market. This general prohibition of State aid read in conjunction with Article 6 of the Energy Community Treaty establishing the duty of loyal cooperation of the Contracting Parties impose an obligation upon the Contracting Parties to comply with the State aid acquis and effectively enforce it.

Generally, support to RE producers in the form of a premium may be considered to constitute State aid. Producers of renewable electricity are advantaged because through FiP and FiT, they obtain more than what they would obtain on the market; they guarantee the producers that they will obtain a price that is higher than the market price. Furthermore, such a scheme is selective because it favours only producers of RE. Since the gradual liberalisation of electricity markets, electricity producers are (at least potentially) engaged in trade between different countries so that the advantage granted to the producers of RE is likely to distort competition and affect trade. Since the premium is mostly financed through some surcharge which is administered by an entity designated by the state, the revenues used for supporting RE producers constitute State resources.

However, State aid may be considered compatible if it facilitates the development of certain economic activities and does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest. In this regard, the EEAG 2014-2020 lay down the conditions under which aid for energy and environment may be considered compatible. As has been pointed out above (see Annex 1 above), the EEAG 2014-2020 require operating aid for RE to be granted as a premium in addition to the market price and determined in a competitive bidding process on the basis of clear, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria.

The EEAG 2014-2020 also set a maximum duration of 10 years for aid schemes. After this period, the scheme needs to be re-notified to the competent State aid authority and will be assessed again and approved or not. The duration of individual aid however is only limited by the full depreciation of the plant according to normal accounting rules.

### Competition law

According to Energy Community law which is directly applicable in all Contracting Parties, anti-competitive agreements as well as abuse of dominance is considered incompatible with the Energy Community Treaty (Article 18(1)(a) and (b) of the Energy Community Treaty).

The prohibition of anti-competitive agreements is of relevance in the framework of the conduct of the companies participating in competition. It prohibits all agreements between undertakings and concerted practices, i.e. concordance of market behaviour between companies which have not reached the level of agreement yet, which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. Any collusion between companies during competitions concerning their bidding behaviour is therefore illegal and falls under this prohibition. Furthermore, many countries also provide for criminal sanctions for companies participating in so-called bid-rigging.

In order to counter this risk, any competition rules should explicitly refer to the prohibition of collusion with the legal consequences attached. Furthermore, it should contain strict confidentiality provisions and monitor the process closely. In case of suspicious bidding behaviour, the competition authority should be contacted.

The prohibition of abuse of dominance is of relevance with regard to the selection of the winning bid(s) which may lead to some companies becoming dominant on a specific market. In such case, the company's behaviour shall be scrutinized closely in order to ensure that it does not abuse its dominant position and instead compete on its merits. This encompasses in particular, but not exclusively, directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by other parties of supplementary obligations which by their nature or according to commercial usage have no connection with the subject of such contracts (tying and bundling).

## Annex 3: Renewable Energy in the Contracting Parties

### Albania

RES Capacities (MW)	2009	2016	NREAP 2020
Hydro	1459	1838	2547
Wind	0	0	30
Solar	0	0	50

### Bosnia and Herzegovina

RES Capacities (MW)	2009	2016	NREAP 2020
Hydro	2213	2180	2375
Wind	0	0,3	143
Solar	0	14	20
Biomass	0	1	19,5

### Kosovo\*

RES Capacities (MW)	2009	2016	NREAP 2020
Hydro	46	71,3	448
Wind	0	1,4	62
Solar	0	0,6	30
Biomass	0	0	20

### Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

RES Capacities (MW)	2009	2016	NREAP 2020
Hydro	553	660	709
Wind	0	37	50
Solar	0	17	25
Biomass	0	6	14

### Moldova

RES Capacities (MW)	2009	2016	NREAP 2020
Hydro	16	16	16
Wind	0	2,3	150
Solar	0	1,8	0
Biomass	0	2,8	10



Montenegro

RES Capacities (MW)	2009	2016	NREAP 2020
Hydro	636	674	826
Wind	0	0	151
Solar	0	0	10
Biomass	0	0	29

Serbia

RES Capacities (MW)	2009	2016	NREAP 2020
Hydro	2877	3013	3276
Wind	0	17	500
Solar	0	11	10
Biomass	0	10	143

Ukraine

RES Capacities (MW)	2009	2016	NREAP 2020
Hydro	5421	5883	6536
Wind	86	437	2280
Solar	0	531	2300
Biomass	0	59	950
Geothermal	0	0	20